Monthly Archives: February 2014

In insurance, are ordinary human shortcomings ‘gross negligence’ ?

Now and again, comparative law allows researchers to be surprised. Even a mundane subject such as insurance contract law can become interesting when looked at from a comparative legal perspective. Here is an example.

Most legal systems somehow exclude the insurer’s contractual liability under the policy where the insured intentionally caused the covered loss. In the UK, for instance, s. 55 Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that the insurer shall not be liable for losses attributable to the wilful misconduct of the insured. And according to the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL), the insured is not entitled to compensation “if the loss was caused by an act or omission on his part with intent to cause the loss or recklessly and with knowledge that the loss would probably result.”

Now imagine a legal system which categorizes the behaviour of the insured according to the following categories: innocent, negligent, grossly negligent and intentional. Then imagine a case where the insured himself causes the damage covered under the policy. And then ask yourself in what category you would place the insured’s act.

Here they come:

·         In car insurance, the insured allows his unleashed dwarf poodle to sit next to him on the passenger seat floor whilst he is driving the vehicle. When the dog unexpectedly climbs over to the driver’s part and interferes with the pedals (‘he never did that before!’), the vehicle crashes. The insurer refuses to cover on grounds of ‘gross negligence’.

·         In car insurance, while smoking a cigarette, the driver of a vehicle approaches a traffic light. Suddenly, the cigarette falls and lands between the driver’s legs. This distracts the driver, who then causes an accident.

·         In house insurance, the insured left her washing machine connected to the water mains while she went out to the hairdresser’s. In her absence, a cracked bolt in the inlet hose caused the hose to burst and damage the building. The damage could have been prevented if the insured had turned off the water or disconnect the hose before going out.   

Personally, I would not categorize any of these under the heading of ‘intentionally caused loss’. More importantly, I would not file them under ‘gross negligence’ either. In fact, I would find this behaviour rather commonplace. At least, I wouldn’t think to unplug my washing machine each time I leave my house. And if I was a smoker, I think my car was just about the only place left where I could smoke….

However, German courts actually decided in each of the above cases that the insured was grossly negligent. What could explain this? Am I just an overly permissive Dutchman and are German courts rightly upholding high ethical standards (or at least legal standards) for insureds? Is this just a matter of difference in legal culture? Or is there something more subtle going on?

Well, if I was a bit cynical I could postulate the following proposition. Courts want to have something to decide on. And deciding that certain behaviour constitutes plain and simple negligence doesn’t give German courts much to decide: the insurer will just have to pay on the insurance… If, however, the court were to find gross negligence in the insured’s behaviour, it would authorize the court to ‘to reduce the payment due in proportion to the severity of the fault of the insured’ (§ 81 Versicherungsvertragsgesetz 2008).

So, by labelling the insured’s behaviour as ‘gross negligence’, the courts unlock a further power to their own benefit, namely the power to start considering all kinds of facts, circumstances and intricate considerations, to weigh all these and then reach a well-reasoned conclusion on a fair distribution (in percentages!) of the damage between insured and insurer. And since German insurance law definitely has developed a love for proportionality, it may just even make sense to label commonplace inadvertence and day-to-day negligence as ‘grossly negligent’.

Plausible as this proposition may sound, it is historically flawed nonetheless. The tradition of stretching ‘gross negligence’ to cover behaviour otherwise considered ‘normal negligence’ was not introduced with the 2008 Insurance Contract Act. It had already matured under the ‘old’ Insurance Contract Act 1908, which attached a complete vitiation of the claim on the insurer in case of gross negligence (§ 61 VVG 1908). So, it seems that the tradition has merely been extended into modernity. So, yes, German courts were in fact already upholding high standards for insureds. With the introduction of the 2008 Insurance Contract Act, the ‘percentage virus’ has just diluted the strong medicine of the all-or-nothing remedy into an instrument of the pervasive proportionality doctrine.

Yet, there may be some good news. Although German courts seem to be rather stern and strict on negligent insureds, a recent case shows that there may still be absolution for sinners:

A student turns on the oven, inserts a pizza, sets the alarm on his mobile phone on 10 minutes and leaves the kitchen. Accidentally, by turning on the oven he has inadvertently also turned on the ceramic stove top. Before the ten minutes are over, the kitchen catches fire due to items on the stove top. The court concludes that the student had not acted grossly negligent.

So, there is some room yet for ordinary human shortcomings ….


The court decisions referred to are the following:

  • OLG Nürnberg 14 October 1993, docket no. 8 U 1482/93 (poodle)
  • OLG Karlsruhe 30 April 1992, docket no. 12 U 16/92 (smoking & driving)
  • LG Osnabrück 20 April 2012, VersR 2013/6, p. 233 (washing machine)
  • Landgericht Magdeburg 20 June 2013, docket no. 10 O 1779/13 (pizza)


De politieke kleur van het BW

Heeft het BW een politiek kleurtje? Menig civilist zal de wenkbrauwen fronsen bij die vraag. Was het BW niet een technisch-juridisch wetboek dat vooral definieert, systematiseert en door middel van de gelaagde structuur leuke breinbrekers voor examenvragen levert? Of kan men aan het BW toch de politieke kleur van de wetgever zien?

Het is deze vraag die Christiaan de Jongste en ik onderzoeken in een artikel dat binnenkort in het Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Burgerlijk Recht (2014/2) zal verschijnen. Natuurlijk roept dit de methodologische vervolgvraag op hoe men de politieke ‘kleur’ van een privaatrechtelijke wet meten kan. Beide vragen behandelen we, en dus formuleren we niet alleen een antwoord op de inhoudelijke vraag of privaatrechtelijke wetgeving ‘kleur’ bekent. We leveren ook een bijdrage aan de kwantitatieve methode van bestudering van het privaatrechtelijke wetgeving.

De hypothese over wetgeving die wij in onze bijdrage centraal stellen, is zeer eenvoudig. Wij veronderstellen dat wetgeving in formele zin en dus ook wijzigingen van het BW een weerspiegeling zijn van de politieke kleur van de desbetreffende regeringscoalitie. We negeren alle andere invloeden (zoals die van ambtenaren en lobbygroepen) en concentreren ons dus op het verband tussen coalitiekleur en wetgevingskleur. Natuurlijk zijn tal van nuanceringen en kanttekeningen denkbaar bij deze simpele hypothese. Toch blijkt uit onze bijdrage dat onze werkwijze robuuste resultaten oplevert.

In het artikel verkennen we eerst het construct ‘politieke ideologie’ voor zover van belang voor het privaatrecht, en bekijken we hoe in eerder onderzoek modellering en meting daarvan vorm kreeg. Vervolgens rapporteren wij ons eigen onderzoek. We lieten door middel van crowd-sourced coding een grote groep experts ‘vignettes’ van wetsvoorstellen coderen op achterliggende ideologie. Met een standaard politicologische methode konden we de kleur van coalities van de afgelopen twintig jaar coderen. Zodoende kon worden getoond dat tijdens rechtse en conservatieve kabinetten minder progressieve en linkse wijzigingswetten worden aangenomen dan onder linkse en progressieve kabinetten. Vooral bij wetsvoorstellen ‘privaatrecht achter de voordeur’ (personen- en familierecht) was het aandeel conservatieve wetten tijdens de regeerperiode van een conservatief kabinet significant hoger dan bij progressieve of middenkabinetten. Verder bleek dat de bestudeerde wijzigingswetten over het algemeen progressief en links van aard zijn.

In het artikel staan we natuurlijk uitgebreid stil bij de theorie, methodologie, de beperkingen van de opzet van ons onderzoek en op vervolgvragen. Het artikel is te vinden op

Insurance Contracts Act 2014 : Initial Draft Published

On January 14, 2014, the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission published an initial draft of their Insurance Contract Law Draft Bill for limited consultation.

Following the drastic overhaul of pre-contractual duties of disclosure in consumer insurance contracts with the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, the Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission have now turned their attention to ‘non-consumer’ insurance contracts (in other words: B2B insurance).

This first draft contains provisions on ‘the duty of fair presentation’, insurers’ remedies for fraudulent claims, damages for late payment by the insurer. Arguably, the most dramatic move is to abolish the remedy of avoidance for breach of the duty of utmost good faith. In return, however, a subtle system on ‘fair presentation of the risk’ is introduced. According to the Draft, the proposer (i.e., the business applying for insurance) is under a duty to fairly present the risk to the insurance company. This entails both a duty to disclose certain material information on the risk and a duty not to misrepresent the risk. So, much like under the ‘utmost good faith doctrine’ in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (MIA), the duty of disclosure and duty not to make misrepresentations are blended into one. With the introduction of a ‘duty of fair presentation’, the sections 18, 19 and 20 of the MIA and related common law doctrines will be omitted/abolished.

How does the ‘duty of fair presentation’ work?

It takes some careful reading of the Draft to appreciate the structure of the duty. So, instead of giving a long-winding analysis of the Draft, I decided to visualise the duty in a number of slides. I hope they somehow simplify the accessibility of the Draft itself. Please feel free to reuse with courtesy reference.

Click here for the presentation: fair presentation

The duty of ‘fair presentation’: combining doctrines of misrepresentation and mistake?

The concept of ‘fair presentation’ is not only practically relevant for insurance contracts but may also prove to be doctrinally innovative. So far, the common law has not developed a general theory of a pre-contractual duty to disclose correct material information and to avoid mistake by withholding information or giving incorrect/misleading information. In fact, outside the utmost good faith doctrine there is no general pre-contractual duty to disclose material information. instead, the common law tends to treat issues of misrepresentation and mistake as separate and distinct. Perhaps the introduction of a duty to ‘fairly present the risk’ in insurance law can help to illuminate general contract law discussions in this respect.